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ABSTRACT
In this article the authors describe their comprehensive analysis of moderating factors
of cross-brand effects of price changes and contribute to the literature in five major ways.
(1) They consider an extensive set of potential variables influencing cross-brand effects of
price changes. (2) They examine moderators for the immediate as well as the dynamic
cross-price effect. (3) They decompose price into regular and promotional price and study
both cross-price effects separately. (4) They compare their findings with previous litera-
ture on the moderating factors of own-price effects to understand which factors influence
own-price elasticity through affecting brand switching. (5) The authors use an advanced
Bayesian estimation technique. The results show evidence of the neighborhood price ef-
fect and suggest that it is conditional on whether the promoted brand is priced above
or below its competitor. The promoted brand’s activities turn out to play a much more
important role in determining the cross-price promotional effects than its competitor’s
similar activities. The authors outline conditions when cross-brand post-promotion dips
tend to occur. Finally, they argue that the brand choice portion of the overall own-brand
effect of a promotion depends on the brand’s marketing strategy and on category-specific
characteristics.
Key words: Cross-price elasticity; Asymmetry; Dynamic effects; Hierarchical Bayes;
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1 Introduction
For management purposes knowledge of cross-price effects is especially important. First
of all, managers need to know which rival brands have the strongest impact on their
sales. Second, they want to identify the competing brands that are affected the most
by their price changes and consequently from which competitor they should anticipate
reactions. As a next step, it is beneficial for them to recognize whether and how the cross-
price effects can be moderated by their and their competitors’ marketing activities and
positioning decisions. Finally, an interesting question is whether general characteristics
of the product category can explain the degree at which their sales are affected by other
brands’ price changes and their influence on others’ sales.
Patterns of cross-price effects have also been in the center of marketing research (e.g.,
Blattberg and Wisniewski, 1989; Bronnenberg and Wathieu, 1996; Sethuraman and Srini-
vasan, 2002). These patterns help understand brand price competition and market struc-
ture, thereby forces guiding pricing strategies (Sethuraman et al., 1999).
In this study we provide a comprehensive investigation of the moderating factors of
cross-price brand effects. More specifically, we focus on the moderating factors for the
immediate and the dynamic impact of price changes of a brand on its rivals’ sales. With
the dynamic impact we mean the impact of a current marketing action on future periods.
For a temporary price promotions this can be measured by the cumulative effect over the
future periods. For a permanent change in price, such as the adjustment of regular price
level, we measure the permanent impact, that is the impact on periods far in the future.
We contribute to the literature in five major ways: (i) we extend the list of studied
moderating variables for cross-price effects; (ii) we look at immediate and dynamic cross-
price effects; (iii) we decompose price into the regular price and the promotional price
and consider their cross effects separately; (iv) we compare the moderators of cross-price
elasticities with the moderators for the own-price effects found in Fok et al. (2006), and (v)
we estimate the cross-price effects and the impact of moderating variables simultaneously
in an efficient manner using a Hierarchical Bayes model. Below we further elaborate on
these contributions.
First, we consider several category-specific factors and separate their effects from the
influence of similar brand-specific variables. Furthermore, in addition to providing new
empirical evidence on the neighborhood and the asymmetric price effects (e.g., Blattberg
andWisniewski, 1989; Bronnenberg andWathieu, 1996; Sethuraman and Srinivasan, 2002)
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we investigate whether the neighborhood effect depends on which of the two brands is
priced above. That is, we allow for asymmetry in the neighborhood effect. Regarding the
brand-specific covariates, an interesting question is which brand’s characteristics play a
more important role in shaping the cross-price effects; those of the “victim brand”, i.e.,
the brand whose sales are affected by the price changes of the other brand, or those of the
“attacker brand”, i.e., the brand that changes its price. Note that although these terms
clearly give the direction of the impact, it is not a priori known that the “victim brand”
will actually loose sales. The cross-brand effect could be zero or in special cases even
negative. Nonetheless, we will use the terms attacker and victim throughout this paper
to denote the two brands involved in a specific cross-brand effect.
Second, we examine the moderators for the immediate effects and the dynamic cross-
price effects. So far, the literature on cross-brand effects of price promotions focused on
the immediate or the long-run impact and did not consider the possibility of temporary
dynamic effects. The impact of price promotions of competing brands is probably not
limited to the immediate effect. For example, purchase acceleration may result in extra
inventory of the promoted brand. This additional inventory preempts future purchases
of competing brands (Ailawadi et al., 2007). This will especially hold for the influence
of a high-priced brand on a lower-priced brand. If an expensive high quality product is
for sale customers who, due to their tight budget constraint, usually buy a cheaper lower
quality brand may be inclined to stockpile the product and enjoy its benefits in the coming
periods, thereby postponing their usual purchase. So, asymmetry with respect to price
may be more important when considering the dynamic effect of a price promotion than
in case of the immediate effect. Additionally, deeper discounts provide higher financial
gains when switching to the promoted brand and stockpiling it. Such promotions may
result in a larger dynamic effect of price promotion. These examples illustrate that certain
variables’ influence may differ concerning the immediate effect and the dynamic effect.
We investigate these differences in this article.
Third, we decompose price into regular and promotional price and analyze the cross-
brand effects of both. The literature on own-brand effects has shown that changes in
regular price and price promotions have quite different effects on sales (Bijmolt et al.,
2005; Bucklin and Gupta, 1999; Fok et al., 2006). This is also likely to be the case for
cross-brand effects. For the promotional price and the regular price the immediate effect
is clearly of interest. Concerning the dynamic effect, for regular price we focus on the
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(moderating factors of the) permanent or long-run effect. In this case, the permanent
effect is the effect of the price change on competitors’ sales far into the future. With
respect to the price promotions, we consider the (moderating factors of the) cumulative
effect. The cumulative effect equals the sum of the promotional effects on competitors’
sales over all periods.
Fourth, we compare our findings with the results of Fok et al. (2006) on the moder-
ating factors of own-price effects to understand which factors influence own-price elas-
ticity through affecting brand switching. These results reveal whether the category inci-
dence/brand choice/quantity division of the total own-effects of promotions may depend
on the involved brands’ marketing strategies or category-specific characteristics. That is,
they provide further insights into the decomposition of promotional response (Bell et al.,
1999).
Finally, in our investigation we rely on an efficient econometric technique, the Hier-
archical Bayes (HB) - Error Correction Model (ECM). This model allows us to directly
estimate the potentially differing immediate and dynamic effects of price changes of a
brand on its rival brands’ sales and to simultaneously relate these effects to characteris-
tics of brands and categories. Within the model we explicitly distinguish between (cross)
promotional price elasticities and (cross) regular price elasticities.
In sum, our analysis provides important insights for brand managers of the attacker
and the victim brands and for marketing scholars on the determinants that moderate the
cross-brand effect of price changes.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. We first present a systematic discussion of
the literature on the considered moderating effects and outline our conceptual research
framework. Next, we specify a sales response model to measure and explain the differences
in the immediate and dynamic cross-brand effects of promotional and regular prices. In
Section 4 we present the results of or empirical application based on a scanner database
on weekly sales volumes of the largest four brands in 25 product categories of fast moving
consumer goods. We end the paper with a discussion and conclusions in Section 5.
2 Moderating factors of the cross-price effects
The conceptual framework that guides our research is depicted in Figure 1. In this
figure we relate the cross-price effect to brand variables, category variables and variables
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describing the relative positioning of the two involved brands. More precisely, we focus
on the effect of price promotions and regular price changes of brand A on the sales of
the rival brand V in the short- and in the long-run. In the figure letter A refers to the
attacker and V to the victim brand.
Below we discuss the literature concerning the variables we consider in our empirical
section. For each characteristic we summarize the literature and, if possible, provide a
hypothesis for the expected moderating effect. However, in many cases, especially for the
dynamic effects, we cannot formulate such hypotheses based on the literature. In these
cases we search for empirical evidence on whether and how the considered characteristics
are related to the (dynamic) effects of price. To facilitate a direct comparisons with
findings on own-price effects, we keep our set of moderating factors as similar as possible
to that in Fok et al. (2006).
2.1 Relative positioning of brands.
An interesting and well-researched aspect of cross-price effects concern the relative (price)
positioning of the attacker versus the victim brand. Examples of this are the asymmetric
and the neighborhood cross-price effect (Blattberg et al., 1995; Bronnenberg and Wathieu,
1996; Sethuraman, 1995; Sethuraman et al., 1999; Sethuraman and Srinivasan, 2002).
Asymmetric price effect. Higher priced brands have been found to be perceived
as being of better quality. This implies that price promotions by a higher-priced (better
quality) brand will be more attractive for the lower-budget segment and therefore affect
lower-priced (lower quality) brands more than the other way around (Allenby and Rossi,
1991; Blattberg and Wisniewski, 1989; Sethuraman et al., 1999, etc.). While promotions
of high-priced brands draw sales from their own price-tier competitors and from the tier
below, lower-quality brands’ promotions rarely take sales from tiers above (Blattberg and
Wisniewski, 1989; Sethuraman, 1995). Asymmetry can also arise from a difference in the
composition of the customer base of the two brands: a high quality (high-priced) brand
captures more loyal customers than a low quality (cheap) one. This leads to a higher
substitution effect for the better quality brand. Further explanations have been provided
in, for example, Blattberg and Neslin (1989) and Hardie et al. (1993). At the same time,
Bronnenberg and Wathieu (1996) point out that this asymmetry only holds if and only if
the quality advantage of the higher priced (higher quality) brand is sufficiently large, in
comparison with its price premium.
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Neighborhood price effect. According to the neighborhood price effect hypothesis,
brands whose prices are closer to each other usually have larger cross-price effects than
brands that have more dissimilar prices. For example, Kamakura and Russell (1989)
show that consumers tend to switch only among brands within a certain price range.
Additional empirical evidence on the neighborhood effect has been found in Rao (1991),
Russel (1992), Sethuraman (1995), and Sethuraman et al. (1999).
An interesting question is whether the neighborhood or the asymmetric price effect is
stronger and whether one amplifies the other. Sethuraman et al. (1999) investigate this
and find that the neighborhood price effect is stronger than the asymmetric price effect,
both when relying on elasticities as on absolute price effects. We furthermore investigate
whether the neighborhood effect depends on which of the two brands is priced above.
Overall, we expect that if the attacker is priced above the victim brand and if the
two brands are positioned closer to each other, the cross-price effect will be higher. We
furthermore anticipate the neighborhood effect to be stronger when the attacker is more
expensive than the victim brand.
Asymmetric and neighborhood size effects. Analogous to the relative price
positioning, the relative positioning of the brands with respect to size may also influence
their cross-price effect. We measure two aspects of the size difference. We investigate
whether brands that are similar in size tend to have larger or smaller cross-price effects
and whether larger brands tend to be less sensitive to smaller brands’ promotions or the
other way around. We use similar measures as for the price effects and call the two effects
the asymmetric and neighborhood size effect.
Literature shows that larger brands usually have higher brand awareness and better
brand salience. Their promotions are therefore easier noticed and identified by customers
(e.g., Rao and Miller, 1975). Additionally, according to the well-established “double
jeopardy” phenomenon smaller brands tend to attract less “loyalty” among their buyers
than large brands do among theirs (Ehrenberg et al., 1990; Martin, 1973). Based on such
considerations Kamakura and Russell (1989), Sethuraman and Srinivasan (2002), and
Sethuraman (1995) suggest that larger brands have a larger influence in a market, and
that their promotions can easily hurt smaller brands. On the other hand, larger brands
are also less vulnerable to smaller brands’ discounts. This shows the possible existence
of asymmetry and the neighborhood size effects. In our empirical study we capture these
effects and also include interaction between the two effects to test for non-linearity in the
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neighborhood size effect.
2.2 Category-and Brand-Specific Characteristics
To study the moderating effect of marketing activities we look at the intensity of marketing
activities at the category level as well as at such intensity for a brand relative to its
category. For example, in some categories promotions may be more frequent or deeper
than in others, but within a category there may also be relevant differences in promotional
policies.
Frequency of price promotions. According to the theory of price consciousness
high frequency of price promotions in a category leads to more price conscious customers
and this induces them to purchase on deal (Fok et al., 2006; Kopalle et al., 1999; Mela
et al., 1998; Yoo et al., 2000). More price conscious consumers may be more likely to
switch between brands. Papatla and Krishnamurthi (1996) similarly find that increased
purchases using coupons erode brand loyalty and increase price sensitivity. These results
suggest that categories with a high frequency of promotional activities are likely to show
substantial brand-switching and therefore a high immediate and dynamic cross-brand
price elasticity.
Within a category, other processes may also play a role. Brands with relatively frequent
price promotions are often considered of lower quality. Consequently, their price discounts
will be less attractive than similar brands with infrequent promotions and will stimulate
less brand switching and less stockpiling behavior. Frequent discounts also lower the
perceived quality of the victim brand whose share therefore is expected to respond more
its competitors’ price discounts (see Fok et al., 2006, and the discussion above on the
asymmetric price effect). For the price promotion frequency of the victim other effects
may also play a role. Frequently promoted brands draw a larger proportion of price-
sensitive customers (Zenor et al., 1998) who are likely to switch away when competitive
brands are on sale. In contrast, Jedidi et al. (1999) point out that frequent promotions of
brands make it unnecessary for the (loyal) customers to switch brands since they know
that a deal on their favored brand will occur in the near future. Finally, Jedidi et al.
(1999) mention that frequent discounts may make customers more likely to stockpile
their favorite brand because they fulfill a greater portion of their demand in promoted
periods.
Overall, the above findings point towards that the frequency of price promotional
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activity of the attacker brand reduces the immediate cross-brand price elasticity and may
have an further moderating impact on the cumulative effect. For the victim we find mixed
indications in the literature and hypothese that, on the whole, their promotion frequency
increases the cross-price effect.
Average depth of promotions. Mehta et al. (2003) find that frequent price pro-
motions with deep discounts lead to large consideration sets. This is confirmed by Teng
(2008) who point out that deep discounts may stimulate otherwise loyal customers to
try other brands. Positive brand experience may make these customers to also consider
the alternative brand in future periods. This indicates a high brand-switching probabil-
ity in frequently promoted categories and in categories that are characterized by deep
discounts. Additionally, deep discounts have been found to increase deal sensitivity (An-
derson and Simester, 2004) and the variability of brand sales within a category (Raju,
1992). We therefore expect higher cross-brand elasticities in categories characterized by
deeper discounts.
At the brand level, consumers may believe that deep discounts indicate lower quality
(Jedidi et al., 1999; Mela et al., 1998) and unjustly high margins. On the other hand,
deep price promotions provide a high financial incentive for buying additional items of the
discounted brand and thereby stockpiling the product. This may result in an own-brand
post-promotion dip and may induce a prolonged dip in the sales of competing brands as
well. So, based on the literature we anticipate that general usage of deeper discounts
of the attacker brand will moderate the immediate price elasticity. However, the sign of
the effect is difficult to predict. Deep discounts by the attacker are likely to amplify the
cumulative elasticity. Deep discounts by the victim brands are expected to increase the
immediate effect.
Frequency of feature and display activities. Features and displays are often
used to increase or maintain brand awareness. High brand awareness may increase the
likelihood that the brand will be in the consideration set of customers (Keller, 1993) who
will therefore be more inclined to notice price promotions of these brands and eventually
buy them. Several studies have shown that feature and display activities can be used
to form consideration sets (e.g., Bronnenberg and Wathieu, 1996; Fader and McAlister,
1990; Mehta et al., 2003). Furthermore, retailers and manufacturers often support price
promotions with feature and display activities driven by the belief that such combinations
will generate larger incremental sales response to the promotion (Zhang, 2006). In sum,
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price promotions of attacker and the victim brands and categories with more frequent
display or feature activities are expected to have higher cross-price promotional elasticity.
2.3 Category-Specific Characteristics
In this section we discuss how additional category-characteristics can influence the cross-
brand effect of price changes.
Perishability. The perishable nature of a product category has been found to be an
important feature for the own-price effects, especially with respect to the willingness to
store and stockpile the product (Narasimhan et al., 1996; Raju, 1992; Fok et al., 2006).
In line with these arguments for the own-price effects, we expect that in a category with
non-perishable products a part of the larger own-effect may arise from brand switchers
who have a high propensity to stockpile the product. The larger inventory of the promoted
brand will preempt the purchase of other brands hereby reducing their sales in the near
future (Ailawadi et al., 2007) causing a larger direct cross-brand effect as well as a larger
dynamic (post-promotion) effect.
Utilitarian nature. Shoppers with a relatively low income constitute a large pro-
portion of the consumer population of necessity goods (Bell et al., 1999; Wakefield and
Inman, 2003). This group is more price sensitive and deal-prone. Additionally, in low-
involvement categories brand awareness may be a sufficient condition for brand choice
(Keller, 1993). These findings point towards more brand-switching and therefore larger
cross-brand price effects in more utilitarian categories.
Average budget share. The budget share of a category captures two separate
dimensions: the general price level of the category and the average quantity purchased
in a period. The customer base of more expensive categories consists of higher income
households in general. They are less price sensitive and also less inclined to switch from
their favorite brand when a competitor is on sale. At the same time, promotions in
categories with high average purchase quantity induce customers to switch between brands
and stockpile more (Fok et al., 2006; Mace´ and Neslin, 2004). It is therefore difficult to
make a prediction for the impact of this variable.
Competitive intensity. In the literature on cross-price effects one of the important
findings regarding the competitive intensity is that cross-price effects are stronger when
there are fewer competing brands in the product category (Sethuraman et al., 1999). In
the presence of several similar brands, brand switching is likely to be the dominant source
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of variability in brand sales in a category (Raju, 1992). This is supported by Narasimhan
et al. (1996) who point out that brand proliferation can be a source of weakened brand
loyalty. Mace´ and Neslin (2004) and Ailawadi et al. (2007) on the other hand show
that a large number of competitors may as well imply a lot of differentiation. Product
differentiation makes brands less exposed to competitors’ actions (Narasimhan et al.,
1996) and leads to less brand-switching.
3 Methodology
To describe the dynamic pattern in sales of brands in a number of product categories
we specify a set of flexible vector error correction (VEC) models. Within the model, the
differences in parameters across categories are explained in a second level model. This
hierarchical model is inspired on Fok et al. (2006). The important difference is that in
this article we explicitly focus on the cross-price effects. So, we define moderating factors
for cross-brand price effects in the second level of the model.
Also in this section we use the terminology “attacker” and “victim” brand, that is,
when we consider the effect of the price of brand j on the performance of brand i, we will
call brand j the “attacker” and brand i the “victim”.
3.1 Hierarchical Bayes Analysis
Let Sct denote the Ic-dimensional vector of sales for category c in week t. The Ic-
dimensional vectors Xckt contain the k-th marketing mix variables for the brands in
category c in week t. We specify the following vector error-correction model for cate-
gory c:
∆ log Sct = µc +
K∑
k=1
Ack∆ logXckt +Πc(logSc,t−1 −
K∑
k=1
Bck logXck,t−1) + εct, (1)
with εct ∼ N(0,Σc) for c = 1, . . . , C and t = 1, . . . , Tc. The matrix Πc measures the
speed of adjustment of the sales to the long-run steady state. The matrices Ack and Bck
contain own and cross-brand effects. The own effects are on the diagonal, the cross effects
correspond to the off-diagonal elements. In general, let Aij,ck denote the element of Ack
on row i and column j, this corresponds to the effect of the k-th marketing instrument of
brand j on brand i.
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It is relatively straightforward to show that Aij,ck can be interpreted as the immediate
effect of a change in Xj,ckt on brand i. More formally, it holds that
∂Sict
∂Xjct
Xjckt
Sict
=
∂ logSict
∂ logXjckt
= Aij,ck. (2)
Note that because of the log-log specification in (1), we can interpret these effects as
elasticities. The parameter Bij,ck can be interpreted as either the cumulative effect of a
temporary change in Xjckt on Sic,t+τ , summed over τ = 0, 1, . . . or as the long-run effect
of a permanent shift in Xjckt on the sales levels of brand i in market c, see also Fok et al.
(2006). A temporary change is considered to be a one time change in Xjckt only at time
t, at time t + 1 the variable has returned to its previous level. For a permanent change,
Xjckt increases at time t and stays at that level. In terms of partial effects or elasticities,
the cumulative effect equals
∞∑
τ=0
∂Sict
∂Xjckt
Xjckt
Sict
=
∞∑
τ=0
logSict
logXjckt
= Bij,ck, (3)
and the long-run effect equals
lim
τ→∞
∂Sic,t+τ
∂Xjck
Xjck
Sic,t+τ
=
∂ logSic,t+τ
∂ logXjck
= Bij,ck assuming Xjck = Xjckt = Xjck,t+1 = . . . .
(4)
Our main interest here is in the cross-effects, for notational efficiency we collect all
cross-effects for category c and marketing instrument k in Ic · (Ic−1)-dimensional vectors.
The cross-effect elements from Ack are collected in α˜ck, the elements from Bck in β˜ck.
More precisely,
α˜ck = (A12,ck, A13,ck, . . . , A1I,ck, A21,ck, A23,ck, . . . , A2I,ck, · · · , AI1,ck, AI2,ck, . . . , AI,I−1,ck)′
β˜ck = (B12,ck, B13,ck, . . . , B1I,ck, B21,ck, B23,ck, . . . , B2I,ck, · · · , BI1,ck, BI2,ck, . . . , BI,I−1,ck)′.
(5)
Now α˜ck captures all the immediate effects of a change in the k-th marketing instrument
of a brand in category c on another brand’s sales in the same category. β˜ck refers to all
respective long-run or dynamic effects. Finally, we introduce two functions i(l) and j(l).
These two functions map the index of an element of α˜ck or β˜ck to the index of the victim
and attacker brand, respectively. As an example, i(2) = 1 and j(2) = 3, that is, the
second elasticity in α˜ck corresponds to the cross elasticity of brand 3 on brand 1, see also
(5).
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The immediate and dynamic elasticities are expected to differ across brands and across
categories. Some of these differences can be attributed to observable characteristics of the
category, the attacker brand and/or the victim brand. Examples of such characteristics
are, depth and frequency of promotion or the perishability of the product, as we have
discussed in Section 2. The earlier mentioned neighborhood effects indicate that the dif-
ference between the attacker and victim brand on some scale may be important. Another
part of the differences across elasticities cannot be explained. In sum, we propose to
describe the immediate and dynamic elasticity parameters for the promotional price and
the regular price1 by
α˜l,ck = θ
1
0k + θ
1
1k
′
zi(l),c + θ
1
2k
′
zj(l),c + θ
1
3k
′
g(zi(l),c, zj(l),c) + θ
1
4k
′
zc + η
1
l,ck (6)
β˜l,ck = θ
2
0k + θ
2
1k
′
zi(l),c + θ
2
2k
′
zj(l),c + θ
2
3k
′
g(zi(l),c, zj(l),c) + θ
2
4k
′
zc + η
2
l,ck (7)
where zi,c is an vector containing explanatory variables for brand i in category c, like
frequency and depth of promotion. The vector zc contains a number of variables on the
category level, like category expensiveness. The neighborhood and asymmetry effect is
captured by the function g(), which for example may give the distance between the brands.
In the empirical analysis below we specify
g(zi(l),c, zj(l),c) =

|zj(l),c − zi(l),c|
1zj(l),c>zi(l),c
|zj(l),c − zi(l),c| × 1zj(l),c>zi(l),c
 , (8)
where 1A denotes an indicator function that equals one if the condition A is true and
zero otherwise. In words the function g() contains the absolute difference between the
two brands, an indicator whether the attacker is bigger or more expensive than the victim
brand, and the interaction between these two variables. Note that we do not include these
non-linear effects for all brand characteristics. For notational convenience we have not
made this explicit in (6)-(8). The vectors θ1nk and θ
2
nk, n = 1, . . . , 4 describe the effects of
the brand characteristics on the immediate and the dynamic elasticities, respectively. For
the error terms η1l,ck and η
2
l,ck we assume multivariate normal distributions. More specifi-
cally, we assume these error terms to be uncorrelated across brands, and categories. We
1In the empirical section we will also include other marketing instruments. For these instruments we
do not have a second layer specification as in (6)-(7). We do allow the elasticities for these variables to
differ across brands.
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do however allow for correlation in the error terms across the K marketing-mix variables,
that is, we assume that
η1l,c = (η
1
l,c1, . . . , η
1
l,cK)
′ ∼ N(0,Σ1η) and
η2ij,c = (η
2
l,c1, . . . , η
2
l,cK)
′ ∼ N(0,Σ2η).
(9)
For the own effects we have a similar specification as in (6) and (7) to link the own
effects to brand and category characteristics. Of course in this case only characteristics of
the brand itself and the category play a role. As the focus here is not on the own effects
we do not discuss this further. More details can be found in Appendix A.
To estimate the parameters of our model, (1) with (6)–(8), we consider a Bayesian
approach. In Appendix A we present the full details of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo
simulation method that we apply.
4 Empirical results
We apply our model to explain differences in immediate and dynamic cross-brand effects
of promotional price and regular price on sales across brands and product categories in an
extensive dataset. In Section 4.1 we describe the available data and the product categories
we consider in our analysis. Section 4.2 contains the estimation results.
4.1 Data and Variables
We use the Dominick’s Finer Foods data set for our empirical analysis. This data has
been used and described extensively in, for example, Fok et al. (2006) and Srinivasan
et al. (2004). So, we refer the reader for detailed description of the data to these papers.
We specify 25 error-correction models as in (1) for the 25 FMCG product categories
contained in the data set. In each model, the dependent variable Sct consists of the total
weekly sales of the four largest brands in product category c. As explanatory variables
in the first level of the model we consider the marketing-mix variables, display, feature,
regular price and promotional price indexes. These models are linked together through
the second level equations describing the price effects. The parameters in all model
parts are estimated simultaneously in a Bayesian setting. We consider several variables
as moderating factors of the cross-price elasticities (for their theoretical discussion see
13
Section 2 and for our conceptual model framework Figure 1). A summary and the formal
definition of these variables can be found in Appendix B.
The original database only contains the actual price. We use the decomposition of
the actual price into regular and promotional price as suggested in Fok et al. (2006).
Additionally, we account for seasonality and special holidays and run unit-root tests on
the seasonally adjusted series according to Fok et al. (2006). In line with previous research
(e.g., Fok et al., 2006; Horva´th et al., 2005; Nijs et al., 2001; Pauwels et al., 2002), our
unit-root analysis shows that all sales series are (trend) stationary, after correcting for
possible seasonality and possible breaks in the regular price series.
Our approach differs in several important aspects from Fok et al. (2006). The main
difference is of course in the object that we study. Here we focus on the cross-brand effects
of price changes. Therefore, we also have a substantially higher number of elasticities
to model. In the considered 25 categories with 4 competing brands there are (16 −
4) · 25 = 300 cross-promotional effects and only 4 · 25 = 100 own-brand effects per
instrument. Additionally, when analyzing differences in the cross-brand effects we consider
characteristics of both the attacker and the victim brand.
4.2 Estimation results
We use Gibbs sampling as presented in the Appendix A to obtain insight into the pa-
rameter values. The posterior results below are based on 200,000 draws of which the first
100,000 are used as burn in. To remove correlation in the chain we only consider every
10th draw for the computation of the posterior results. Unreported plots of the draws of
the model parameters of the second layer (6) and (7) show that the Markov Chain has
converged.
First, we summarize the posterior means of the cross effects of the (log) promotional
price index and the log regular price in graphs. Figure 2 presents the distribution of the
posterior means of the immediate cross effects of price promotions and of regular price
changes, the cumulative cross effect of price promotions, and the long-run cross effect of
a regular price change. These histograms show the distribution of the posterior means of
all brand-pairs in the 25 categories. Furthermore, we calculate the number of significant
positive and negative cross effects (see Table 1). Here we loosely use the term significant
to indicate the zero is not contained in the 95% highest posterior density region of the
corresponding parameter.
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For the promotional price most of the (short- and cumulative) cross-price effects are
positive as expected (84% of the 300 cases) and about half of these positive values are
significantly larger than zero. The few negative effects are relatively small in size and
mostly not significant. Van Heerde et al. (2003) provide a possible explanation for the
negative values. A promotion of a brand may remind some customers about the cate-
gory, but these customers buy their strongly preferred brand that is different from the
promoted brand. When turning to the cumulative cross-promotional effects, the number
of significant effects drop. We do not find a single significant negative parameter and only
95 (32%) significant positive mean parameters.
Comparing the histograms for the promotional and regular price actions, we observe
much more dispersion of the cross-effects of regular price changes than of price promotions,
both in the short- and in the long-run. This is similar to the findings of Fok et al. (2006) for
own elasticities. For the regular price the graphs of Figure 2 show much more dispersion
with several positive and negative values. The majority of the posterior means, though,
is positive. Table 1 shows that for about 35% of the brand combinations we find a
negative impact. However, of all immediate cross-regular price effects only about 15% are
significantly different from zero. Interestingly, we find much more (almost 30%) significant
mean parameters for the long-run effect, despite the smaller dispersion. This suggests that
the reduction of regular price of a brand may have serious consequences on the sales of
at least a few of its competing brands. This may be due to a change in brand image
or realization of increased customer value, which are important considerations when the
customer develops its consideration set and later makes the final purchase decision. It is
also important to note that although not many of the effects are significant statistically,
they may very well be economically significant. A reason for not finding many significant
effects can be the lack of (variance in the) data. The regular prices do not change as
frequently as the promotional price index. Therefore, estimating the effects becomes a
more complicated task.
Only by looking at the effects over all brands can we make generalizing statements
on the patterns and the relevance of the cross regular price effects. So, in order to
gain insight into the pattern of the cross-brand dynamic effects we look at the post
cross-promotion dip, using results for each brand in (the first layer of) our model. If
consumers stockpile when a product is on promotion, this may preempt purchases of
other brands at a later point in time. A promotion of a brand will then lead to an
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immediate disadvantageous impact on other brands, but also a harmful impact on other
brands in some periods to come. The cumulative cross-price effect will in this case be
larger than the immediate impact. To measure this, we calculate the posterior probability
that the immediate effect is smaller than the corresponding cumulative/long-term effect
for each cross-elasticity. If we find a large probability, this is a sign that there is a “post
cross-promotional dip”. This probability is calculated as the average, over all draws in
the MCMC sampler, of the percentage of cross effects for which the immediate effect is
smaller than the cumulative/long-term effect. For the promotional price this probability
equals 0.543, for the regular price it is 0.460. This result provides no clear empirical
evidence of the cross-brand post-promotion dip or any systematic dynamic effect. In other
words, most of the cross-price effect happens at the moment of the price change. However,
when we only compare the immediate and dynamic/long-run cross-brand effects when the
attacker brand is priced above the victim brand, this probability increases to 0.596 for
the promotional price (and 0.481 for regular price). This supports the premise that when
an expensive high quality product is for sale customers, who otherwise buy a cheaper and
lower quality alternative, may decide to buy and even to stockpile the discounted brand.
As a result they may postpone their usual purchase of lower quality brand whose sales
will experience a cross-brand post-promotional dip. We find even stronger indication of
cross-brand post promotion dip when focusing on effects of price changes of brands that
use deeper than average promotions and are priced higher than the victim. In this case
the dynamic cross-brand effect is larger than the immediate effect in about 66 percent of
the cases (result not presented in the tables). Deeper discount provides higher financial
gains (and higher increase in customer value) that could induce customers to stockpile
the promoted better quality brand.
4.2.1 Moderating factors of the cross-brand promotional effects
We now turn to the findings based on the second layer of our model and discuss which of
the considered moderating factors explain differences in the cross-effects for promotional
price. Table 2 shows the corresponding posterior results. All brand and category char-
acteristics have been standardized. Thus, the intercept can be interpreted as the mean
effect across all brand combinations. The intercept estimates are smaller for the imme-
diate than for the cumulative cross-brand effect, providing an additional evidence for the
cross-brand post-promotional dip.
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We find quite some factors to have a significant influence on the cross promotional
price effect. Our results indicate partial evidence for the neighborhood price effect in
the short-run. Brands that are closer together in terms of average price, tend to have
larger cross-price effects if the attacker brand is cheaper than the victim brand. How-
ever, when the attacker is cheaper, asymmetry seems to dominate and the cross-brand
response. Cross-brand price elasticity appears to increase with the price (quality) differ-
ence between these brands.2 The cumulative effects are also positively related to these
two phenomena, however, the parameter of the cumulative neighborhood effect is not
significantly different from zero. This is probably due to the increased uncertainty (and
standard deviations) about the effect of brand- and category-specific variables on the
cumulative cross-promotional price effects. The increased uncertainty about the moder-
ating factors’ influence on the cumulative promotional price effect as compared to the
immediate influence seems to be a general phenomenon.
Our results provide evidence for the neighborhood size effect as well, suggesting that
sales of brands with similar size tend to react more to each others’ price promotional
activities. This finding holds irrespectively of whether the attacker or the victim brand is
larger; we find no evidence for an asymmetric size effect. The neighborhood size effect is
stronger in the long run; the parameters we find are about twice as large and significant.
Thus the neighborhood effect not only holds for the impact of a competitor’s price on the
current period, but also for the future periods.
Concerning the use of promotions, the attacker brand’s activities play an important
role in determining the cross-price promotional elasticities, while the victim brand’s ac-
tivities do not seem to influence the cross-brand promotional effects. The attacker’s
promotion frequency reduces the impact of its price cuts on competing brands’ sales. As
discussed before, an explanation can be that brands that are promoted frequently are of-
ten considered to have lower quality, than similar brands that are rarely promoted. At the
same time, while frequent usage of promotions lowers immediate cross-brand elasticity, it
does not affect the cumulative effect.
Brands with deeper promotions in general seem to have a stronger immediate and
2We test the significance of the neighborhood price effect when the attacker is more expensive
than the victim brand by checking whether zero is contained in the highest posterior density region
of the sum of parameters of |Attacker Price Index − Victim Price Index| and |Attacker Price Index −
Victim Price Index| × I[Attacker Price Index > Victim Price Index], the posterior mean of this effect
size is −0.041 + 0.061 = 0.020.
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cumulative impact on other brands. These results suggest that the additional financial
incentive exceeds the effect of lower perceived quality due to deeper discounts. Not only
does it induce more immediate brand switching but also stronger dynamic effects.
A frequent use of displays by the attacker is positively related to the size of the
cross promotional price effect. This result also holds for the cumulative effect. This,
as outlined in Section 2 may be due to the fact that overall displays tend to rise brand
awareness that increases the probability that the brand will be in the consideration set
of customers (Keller, 1993). Notably the effect size is almost the same for the immediate
as the cumulative effect, this implies that the display usage has a very limited impact on
the effect of a price promotion on future sales of other brands.
We find that several category-specific variables shape the cross promotional price effect,
however, some only in the short-run. In markets with a high market concentration, we
find smaller short-term cross promotional price effects. In the long-term it is the other
competitiveness measure, price differentiation, that appears to reduce brand switching.
Indeed, in markets without fierce competition between brands, we would expect less
switching among brands. In line with Mehta et al. (2003), Mela et al. (1998), and Zenor
et al. (1998), we find that markets with more frequent use of price promotions or relatively
deep price promotions tend to have stronger cross promotional price effects. For the
frequency we only find an effect in the short run, for the depth of price promotions we
find a short run and a long run effect. Additionally, average depth of price promotions
within the category seems to be more influential with respect to the cross-brand effect
than the attacker’s depth of price promotion. Another interesting finding is the impact
on the cumulative effect that is about twice as large as on the immediate effect. This may
suggest that deep promotions seriously erode brand-loyalty; people tend to stay with the
brand they bought on sale till a new one is promoted.
Finally, we find that cross promotional price effects are larger in more utilitarian
(lower involvement) categories. In such categories consumers tend to be less brand loyal
and more likely to switch brands.
4.2.2 Moderating factors of the cross-brand effects of changes in regular price
While we find quite some significant moderating variables for the cross-regular price effect
in the short-run, there are none for its long-run effect. An explanation may be that these
moderators mainly affect the speed of realizing the permanent price change and the pace
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at which customers act upon it. Although there are quite some significant long-run effects,
29% see Table 1, it turns out to be very difficult to explain the differences in these long-
run effects. In some cases the entire category will profit from a regular price decrease,
leading to negative cross-price effects. In other cases, we get positive cross price effects
indicating that competitors loose sales if a brand reduces its regular price.
For the immediate effect, we find that a small brand is more affected by a change in
regular price of a large brand, than the other way around. In accordance with our findings
on the promotional effects, we find that mainly the attacker brand’s activities influence the
cross-brand effect of regular price changes. However, this time we find that the attacker’s
promotional frequency increases the cross-price effect. A possible explanation is that if a
frequently promoted brand increases its regular price, more people will be switching away
searching for alternative brands that are of better price-quality ratio. While the attacker’s
feature frequency did not affect price promotional elasticity, it increases the regular price
effect. On the other hand, feature frequency of the category turns out to reduce the effect
of a regular price change.
An interesting finding is that category characteristics that are mostly independent
from any marketing activities play the most important moderating role in the case of
regular price. In utilitarian and perishable categories changes in regular price induce
higher brand switching, but again, only in the short-run.
4.2.3 Relation between the first and the second layer of the model
In Table 3 we present the (co)variances of the error terms for the cross price effects (9).
These results show that while we are able to explain a relatively large part of the variation
in the cross promotional price effects, for the cross regular price effects this is not the case.
Especially for the long run effect the variance of the unexplained part is large. This of
course could also be noted from the fact that none of the explanatory variables turned
out to be significant for the long-run cross regular price effect. Note that the size of
the variance should be judged relative to the observed variation in the price effects, see
Figure 2. Furthermore, we find that there are no significant correlations between the
unobserved components for the cross-promotional and cross-regular price effects.
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4.2.4 Comparison of findings for own- and cross-brand effects
We compare our findings with the results of Fok et al. (2006) on the moderating factors
of own-price effects to understand which factors influence own-price elasticity through
affecting brand switching.
Many of the brand specific variables that influence the own effects of a price change
found in Fok et al. (2006) also explain the cross effects. Average depth of promotion and
display frequency of the brand amplifies own-brand effects and the cross-brand effects in
the short, and in the long-run as well. So, some of the additional own-brand effect due
to deeper promotions or more frequent use of displays of the attacker brand arises from
higher brand-switching. Feature frequency neither influences own-brand nor cross-brand
effects. While for the own effect promotion frequency only influences the cumulative effect,
for the cross-elasticity it only moderates the immediate effect.
At the category level, we find, similar to the brand-specific counterpart, that the
use of deeper promotions in a category increases the own-effect and induces higher brand
switching as well. At the same time, more frequent use of displays, with strong influence at
the brand level, does not have any significant influence at the category level. With respect
to competition we find that less concentrated categories with low price differentiation are
characterized by relatively large own-price promotional effects possibly due to the high
brand-switching.
For utilitarian nature and perishability of categories the results match the least with
respect to the own- and cross-brand promotional effect. While a price promotion in
utilitarian categories results in the same amount of incremental sales as in non-utilitarian
ones, a higher portion of the incremental sales will be due to brand switching for utilitarian
products. Moreover, more perishable categories are characterized by low immediate own-
effects and average dynamic own effect, possibly due to lack of incentives to stockpile.
This phenomenon, however, does not affect the cross-brand elasticities.
Now we turn to the comparison with respect to the moderation for own- and cross-
brand effects of regular price changes. The most intriguing finding is that whereas in Fok
et al. (2006) no brand-specific variables had significant influence on the own-effects, we
find some brand-specific variables that moderate the cross-brand effects. The attacker’s
strategy about the rate of price promotion and feature usage amplifies the immediate
cross-brand price effect of its regular price changes. Among the category-specific variables
perishability and average depth of promotions influence immediate cross-effect, but do not
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affect own-brand elasticity. At the same time, price dispersion only seems to influence the
effect of regular price changes on own sales. The utilitarian nature of the category amplifies
both the own- and the cross-brand effects in the short-run, however only influences the
own-effect in the long-run.
These results suggest that the category incidence/brand choice/quantity division of
the total own effects of promotions is not unconditional; it’s brand choice portion depends
on the brands’ strategy about its marketing instruments and mostly on category-specific
characteristics. A full study of such a conditional decomposition is beyond the scope of
the present paper. However, our results do provide further insights into the decomposition
of promotional response (Bell et al., 1999).
5 Conclusions
Our study provides new insights into the variability of cross-price effects and addresses
a couple of questions raised in previous literature on cross-price elasticities. Through a
hierarchical Bayes Error Correction model for 25 different product categories, we obtained
a number a generalizing findings.
First of all, we find support for the neighborhood cross price promotional effect. How-
ever, we show that this effect only holds if the attacker is in general cheaper (and therefore
probably of lower quality) than the victim brand. In this case if the attacker’s price is
closer to the victim’s price, it’s price promotion induces more customers of the victim
brand to switch. However, when the attacker is more expensive, we do not find evidence
for the neighborhood effect. So, the asymmetry plays a moderating role for the neighbor-
hood effect of price promotions. We also find evidence of neighborhood-size effects in the
short- and in the long-run as well.
Secondly, an interesting finding is that, among the brand-specific variables, activities
of the attacker brand significantly influence the cross-brand promotional price and cross-
brand regular price effects. The variables associated with the victim brand turn out not
to influence the cross-brand price effects. Most of the significant attacker characteristics
coincide with the own brand-specific variables that have been found to influence own-
brand elasticities significantly in Fok et al. (2006). Apparently, some of these earlier
established effects arise from higher brand-switching.
Furthermore, we find that an important factor influencing the cross-brand price effect
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is whether the product category is utilitarian. Both the cross-brand promotional price
and the cross-brand effects of regular changes are significantly larger in more utilitar-
ian (lower involvement) categories. Additionally, the utilitarian nature seems to be the
most important moderator for the regular price, followed by whether the products in the
category are perishable or not.
Our study can be extended in several ways. First of all, we restricted our analysis to
the cross-price effects within a category. Analysis of possible moderating factors for cross-
price effects across categories, and hence considering the possibility of complementarity
in addition to substitutability, would bring new insight to the literature of cross-price
elasticities that would be useful for researchers and practitioners as well. However, one
should not expect to find many significant moderating effects in this case. The cross-effects
across categories will very likely be even smaller than within a category.
The investigation of cross-brand post-promotional effects seems to require further in-
vestigation as well. We showed that if the attacker brand is priced above the victim brand
and if it uses deep promotions, situation that indicates cross-brand post-promotion dip
is likely to occur. There may be situations when such dynamic cross-brand effects arise.
The investigation of these conditions would be interesting for marketing theory and prac-
tice. An interesting line of research would be to reveal the conditions under which such
cross-brand price promotion effects arise.
As we discussed in our section about the empirical analysis, the insignificant cross-
brand effects of the immediate and long-run effects of regular price changes, and therefore
the insignificant effect of the moderating factors on these elasticities, may be due to the
low volatility of the regular price variables in our dataset. Data with a larger longitudinal
dimension and with more regular price changes would facilitate the understanding of
cross-brand effects of changes in regular price.
Our analysis concerned FMCGs. An important question would be whether our findings
could be generalized over other categories, to durable products and/or to categories that
induce higher involvement of the customers.
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Figure 1: Our conceptual research framework
 
Figure 2: Histogram of cross price effects
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Table 1: Counts related to the sign and significance of the cross-price effects per
brand combination. In total there are 25× 4× 3 = 300 cross-price effects
Promotional Regular
price price
Immediate effect
Significant and negative 10 2
Not significant and negative 39 102
Not significant and positive 119 157
Significant and positive 132 39
Cumulative/Long run effect
Significant and negative 0 24
Not significant and negative 52 85
Not significant and positive 153 128
Significant and positive 95 63
Cumulative/Long run effect − Immediate effect
Significant and negative 3 33
Not significant and negative 134 127
Not significant and positive 155 124
Significant and positive 8 16
Note: “Significant” should be read as: zero is not contained in the 95% HPD
region.
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Table 3: Error variances cross price effects (Σ1η and Σ
2
η), posterior means with pos-
terior standard errors in parentheses
Immediate cross Immediate cross
promotional price regular price
Immediate cross promotional price effect 0.0272 -0.0006
(0.0036) (0.0131)
Immediate cross regular price effect -0.0006 0.2753
(0.0131) (0.2100)
Cumulative cross Long run cross
promotional price regular price
Cumulative cross promotional price 0.0301 0.0139
(0.0051) (0.0237)
Long run cross regular price 0.0139 1.1954
(0.0237) (0.1567)
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A Bayesian estimation
In this appendix we discuss the details of the Bayesian analysis of our model. We consider some
technical details and we present all used conditional distributions. For the model analysis we
explicitly model the first observation, that is for the analysis we consider the exact likelihood
function. As for the first observation lags are not available, we put this observation equal to the
long-run equilibrium level, that is,
logSc1 = −Π−1c µc +
K∑
k=1
Bck logXck1 + εc1 (10)
with ε1c ∼ N(0, Vc), where Vc is the long-run variance. This variance can be obtained from
solving the system by repeated substitution and is given by Vc =
∑∞
j=0 Γ
j
cΣc(Γ′c)j , where Γc =
I+ Πc. The variance is finite if the eigenvalues of Γc are within the unit circle, that is, in case
of stationarity.
To derive the likelihood function, we summarize the elements of Ak and Bk which we relate
to the own effects, in the K-dimensional row vectors αic = [Aii,ck]Kk=1 and βic = [Bii,ck]
K
k=1. The
equations we impose for the own effects can be written as
αic = Λ′1hic + ν
1
ic (11)
βic = Λ′2hic + ν
2
ic (12)
for i = 1, . . . , Ic, where hic denotes an L × 1 vector of explanatory variables. We specify ν1ic ∼
N(0,Σ1ν) and ν
2
ic ∼ N(0,Σ2ν). We collect the cross effects over different marketing instruments
in the vectors α˜lc = (α˜lc1, . . . , α˜lcK)′ and β˜lc = (β˜lc1, . . . , β˜lcK)′. We compactly write the second
stage equations (6) and (7) as
α˜lc = Θ′1Zlc + η
1
lc (13)
β˜lc = Θ′2Zlc + η
2
lc (14)
where Zlc collects all variables in (6) and (7), and ηnlc = (η
n
lc1, . . . , η
n
lcK)
′, n = 1, 2.
The likelihood function of the model is given by
C∏
c=1
∫
αc,βc
∫
α˜c,β˜c
φ(εc1; 0, Vc)
Tc∏
t=2
φ(εct; 0,Σc)
Ic∏
i=1
φ(αic; Λ′1hic,Σ
1
ν)φ(βic; Λ
′
2hic,Σ
2
ν)×
Ic(Ic−1)∏
l=1
φ(α˜lc; Θ′1Zic,Σ
1
η)φ(β˜lc; Θ
′
2Zlc,Σ
2
η)dα˜cdβ˜cdαcdβc, (15)
where φ(x;µ,Σ) is the density function of the multivariate normal distribution with mean µ
and variance Σ evaluated at x, and where αc = (α′1c, . . . , α′Icc)
′, βc = (β′1c, . . . , β′Icc)
′, α˜c =
(α˜′1c, . . . , α˜′Ic(Ic−1),c)
′, and β˜c = (β˜′1c, . . . , β˜′Ic(Ic−1),c)
′.
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To obtain posterior results, we use the Gibbs sampling technique of Geman and Geman
(1984) with data augmentation, see Tanner and Wong (1987). An introduction into the Gibbs
sampler can be found in Casella and George (1992), see also Smith and Roberts (1993) and
Tierney (1994). Latent variables are sampled alongside the model parameters. The Bayesian
analysis is largely based on uninformative priors for the model parameters. To improve conver-
gence of the MCMC sampler we impose inverted Wishart priors on the Σnη and Σ
n
ν , n = 1, 2
parameters with scale parameter κ1IK and degrees of freedom κ2. We set the value of κ1 to
1 and κ2 equal to K + 3 such that the influence of the prior on the posterior distribution is
marginal, see Hobert and Casella (1996) for a discussion.
Below we derive the full conditional posterior distributions of the model parameters and all
latent variables. In deriving the sampling distributions we build on the general results in Zellner
(1971, Chapter VIII), and those in Fok et al. (2006). Altough we use a slightly different notation
here, the sampling distributions for some parameters are actually exactly the same as in Fok et
al. (2006). For completeness, we however present all results here.
Sampling of Πc
To sample Πc we follow the same approach as in Fok et al. (2006), that is we rely on a Metropolis-
Hastings [MH] sampler (Metropolis et al., 1953; Hastings, 1970). As the candidate we consider
the distribution that would result if we ignore the first observation, that is, we write (1) as
∆ logSct − µc −
K∑
k=1
Ack∆logXckt = Πc(logSc,t−1 −
K∑
k=1
Bck∆logXck,t−1) + εct. (16)
We summarize this equation as Yct = ΠcWct + εct, where Yct and Wct denote the corresponding
terms in (16). Ignoring the observation for t = 1 we would obtain a normal full conditional
posterior distribution with mean
Πˆ′c =
(
Tc∑
t=2
WctW
′
ct
)−1( Tc∑
t=2
WctY
′
ct
)
(17)
and variance
ΣˆΠ′c =
Σc ⊗( Tc∑
t=2
WctW
′
ct
)−1 . (18)
This distribution is expected to be similar to the true posterior distribution, therefore it will
work well as a candidate for the M-H sampler. The sampled candidate is denoted by Πcandc . The
difference in the candidate and the target density is only in the first observation. This allows us
to write the acceptance-rejection probability as
φ(ε1c; 0, Vc)|Πc=Πcandc φ(Πcand′c ; Πˆ′c, ΣˆΠ′c)φ(Πold′c ; Πˆ′c, ΣˆΠ′c)
φ(ε1c; 0, Vc)|Πc=Πoldc φ(Πold′c ; Πˆ′c, ΣˆΠ′c)φ(Πcand′c ; Πˆ′c, ΣˆΠ′c)
=
φ(ε1c; 0, Vc)|Πc=Πcandc
φ(ε1c; 0, Vc)|Πc=Πoldc
, (19)
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where Πoldc denotes the previous draw and εc1 = logSc1 +Π
−1
c µc −
∑K
k=1Bck logXck1, see Chib
and Greenberg (1995) for a similar approach in an exact likelihood analysis of an autoregressive
model.
Sampling of Σc
Our treatment of the first observations also leads to a non standard sampling distribution for Σc.
We use the same procedure as for Πc, that is, we use a Metropolis-Hastings sampler where we
construct the candidate ignoring the first observations. The candidate Σcandc is therefore sampled
from an inverted Wishart distribution with scale parameter
∑Tc
t=2 εctε
′
ct and Tc − 1 degrees of
freedom, where εct = ∆ logSct−µc−
∑K
k=1Ak∆logXckt−Πc(logSc,t−1−
∑K
k=1Bck∆logXck,t−1).
The acceptance-rejection probability equals
φ(ε1c; 0, Vc)|Σc=Σcandc
φ(ε1c; 0, Vc)|Σc=Σoldc
, (20)
where Σoldc denotes the previous draw of Σc.
Sampling of Λn and Θn, n = 1, 2
The full conditional distributions of Λn and Θn are all multivariate normal. Below we present
the derivation for Λ1. Next we summarize the parameters of the multivariate normal for Λ2 and
Θn, n = 1, 2 in a table. To sample Λ1, we note that we can write (11) as
α′ic = h
′
icΛ1 + ν
1
ic
′
, (21)
and hence it is a multivariate regression model with regression matrix Λ1. Hence, the full
conditional posterior distribution of Λ1 is a matrix normal distribution with mean(
C∑
c=1
Ic∑
i=1
hich
′
ic
)−1( C∑
c=1
Ic∑
i=1
hicαic
)
, (22)
and covariance matrix Σ1ν ⊗
(
C∑
c=1
Ic∑
i=1
hich
′
ic
)−1 . (23)
The corresponding means and covariance matrices for the other full conditional distributions
are given below
Parameter Mean Covariance matrix
Λ2
(∑C
c=1
∑Ic
i=1 hich
′
ic
)−1 (∑C
c=1
∑Ic
i=1 hicβic
) (
Σ2ν ⊗
(∑C
c=1
∑Ic
i=1 hich
′
ic
)−1)
Θ1
(∑C
c=1
∑Ic(Ic−1)
l=1 ZlcZ
′
lc
)−1 (∑C
c=1
∑Ic(Ic−1)
l=1 Zlcα˜lc
) (
Σ1η ⊗
(∑C
c=1
∑Ic(Ic−1)
l=1 ZlcZ
′
lc
)−1)
Θ2
(∑C
c=1
∑Ic(Ic−1)
l=1 ZlcZ
′
lc
)−1 (∑C
c=1
∑Ic(Ic−1)
l=1 Zlcβ˜lc
) (
Σ2η ⊗
(∑C
c=1
∑Ic(Ic−1)
l=1 ZlcZ
′
lc
)−1)
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Sampling of Σnν and Σ
n
η , n = 1, 2
To sample these covariance matrices we note that (11) to (14) are a multivariate regression
models. Hence the full conditional posterior distribution of are inverted Wishart distribution
with scale parameter and degrees of freedom as defined in the overview below.
Covariance Scale parameter Degrees of freedom
Σ1ν κ1IK +
∑C
c=1
∑Ic
i=1(αic − Λ′1zic)(αic − Λ′1hic)′ κ2 +
∑C
c=1 Ic
Σ2ν κ1IK +
∑C
c=1
∑Ic
i=1(βic − Λ′2hic)(βic − Λ′2gic)′ κ2 +
∑C
c=1 Ic
Σ1η κ1IK +
∑C
c=1
∑Ic(Ic−1)
l=1 (α˜lc −Θ′1Zlc)(α˜lc −Θ′1Zlc)′ κ2 +
∑C
c=1 Ic(Ic − 1)
Σ2η κ1IK +
∑C
c=1
∑Ic(Ic−1)
l=1 (β˜lc −Θ′2Zlc)(β˜lc −Θ′2Zlc)′ κ2 +
∑C
c=1 Ic(Ic − 1)
The κ terms results from the inverted Wishart priors which are used to improve convergence of
our Gibbs sampler (Hobert and Casella, 1996).
Sampling of αc and βc
First we need to define some additional notation. We split up Xckt = (Xck1t, . . . , XckIct)
′ for
k = 1, . . . ,K into two parts Xowncit = [Xckit]
K
k=1 and X
cross
cit = [[Xckjt]
K
k=1]
Ic
j=16=i to disentangle the
own effects from the cross effects. Note that Xowncit and X
cross
cit are both row vectors. Now further
define Xownct = diag(X
own
c1t , . . . , X
own
cIct
) and Xcrossct = diag(X
cross
c1t , . . . , X
cross
cIct
).
To sample αc and βc jointly we rewrite the second equation of (30) as
logSc1 − logXcrossc1 β˜c +Π−1c µc =
(
0 logXownc1
)(αc
βc
)
+ εc1
∆logSct − µc −∆logXcrossct α˜c −Πc(logSc,t−1 − logXcrossc,t−1β˜c) =
(
∆logXownct −Πc logXownc,t−1
)(αc
βc
)
+ εct,
(24)
which we write in matrix notation as
Yct =Wct
(
αc
βc
)
+ εct, (25)
with the obvious definitions for Yct as the left-hand side of the equation and Wct the matrix
appearing on the right-hand side. The variance of εc1 is Vc and the variance of εct, t > 1 equals
Σc. Note that we use different definitions for Wct and Yct for t = 1 versus t > 1. Next we write
the Ic equations of (11) and (12) as
−U1c = −IKIcαc + ν1c
−U2c = −IKIcβc + ν2c ,
(26)
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where Unc is a (KIc)-dimensional vector containing the terms Λ
′
nhic, i = 1, . . . , Ic, for n = 1, 2
and where IKIc is a (KIc)-dimensional identity matrix. The error term ν
n
c is normal distributed
with mean 0 and covariance matrix (IIc ⊗ Σnν ), n = 1, 2. To sample αc and βc, we combine and
standardize (25) and (26)
Vc
− 1
2Yc1 = Vc−
1
2Wc1
(
αc
βc
)
+ Vc−
1
2 εc1
Σc−
1
2Yct = Σc−
1
2Wct
(
αc
βc
)
+Σc−
1
2 εct−(IIc ⊗ Σ1ν− 12 )U1c
−(IIc ⊗ Σ2ν−
1
2 )U2c
 =
−(IIc ⊗ Σ1ν− 12 ) 0
0 −(IIc ⊗ Σ2ν−
1
2 )
(αc
βc
)
+
(IIc ⊗ Σ1ν− 12 )ν1c
(IIc ⊗ Σ2ν−
1
2 )ν2c
 ,
(27)
where A−
1
2 denotes the inverse of the Choleski decomposition of the matrix A, that is A−
1
2 =
(A
1
2 )−1 with A
1
2A
1
2
′
= A. Hence, the full conditional posterior distribution of (α′c, β′c)′ is normal
with mean((
(IIc ⊗ Σ1ν−1) 0
0 (IIc ⊗ Σ2ν−1)
)
+W ′c1V
−1
c Wc1 +
Tc∑
t=2
(W ′ctΣ
−1
c Wct)
)−1
((
(IIc ⊗ Σ1ν−1)U1c
(IIc ⊗ Σ2ν−1)U2c
)
+ (W ′c1V
−1
c Yc1) +
Tc∑
t=2
(W ′ctΣ
−1
c Yct)
)
, (28)
and covariance matrix((
(IIc ⊗ Σ1ν−1) 0
0 (IIc ⊗ Σ2ν−1)
)
+W ′c1V
−1
c Wc1 +
Tc∑
t=2
(W ′ctΣ
−1
c Wct)
)−1
(29)
Sampling of µc, α˜c and β˜c
Equation (10) and (1) can now be written as
logSc1 − logXownc1 βc =
(
−Π−1c 0 logXcrossc1
)
µc
α˜c
β˜c
+ εc1
∆logSct −∆logXownct αc
−Πc(logSc,t−1 − logXownc,t−1βc) =
(
IIc ∆logX
cross
ct −Πc logXcrossc,t−1
)
µc
α˜c
β˜c
+ εct,
(30)
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where α˜c and β˜c capture the cross-effects in the matrices Ack and Bck for k = 1, . . . ,K. This
system can be written in a multivariate regression model
Yct =Wctγ + εct, (31)
where Yct contains the left-hand side of (30), Wct contains (−Π−1c
...0
... logXcrossc1 ) for the first
observation and (Ic
...∆ logXcrossct
...−Πc logXcrossc,t−1) for the remaining observations, and where γ =
(µ′c, α˜′c, β˜′c)′. The error term is normal distributed with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σc (and
Vc for the first observation).
In the same manner as before we collect and standardize the information from the second
layer of the hierarchical model.
−U˜1c = −IKIc(Ic−1)α˜c + η1c
−U˜2c = −IKIc(Ic−1)β˜c + η2c ,
(32)
where U˜nc stacks the Ic(Ic − 1) vectors Θ′nZlc, n = 1, 2.
Vc
− 1
2Yc1 = Vc−
1
2Wc1γ + Vc−
1
2 εc1
Σc−
1
2Yct = Σc−
1
2Wctγ +Σc−
1
2 εct−(IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ1η− 12 )U˜1c
−(IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ2η−
1
2 )U˜2c
 =
0 −(IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ1η− 12 ) 0
0 0 −(IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ2η−
1
2 )
 γ+
+
(IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ1η− 12 )η1c
(IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ2η−
1
2 )η2c
 .
(33)
Hence, the full conditional distribution of γ is normal with mean

0 0 0
0 (IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ1η−1) 0
0 0 (IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ2η−1)
+W ′c1V −1c Wc1 + Tc∑
t=2
(W ′ctΣ
−1
c Wct)

−1


0
(IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ1η−1)U˜1c
(IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ2η−1)U˜2c
+ (W ′c1V −1c Yc1) + Tc∑
t=2
(W ′ctΣ
−1
c Yct)
 , (34)
and covariance matrix

0 0 0
0 (IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ1η−1) 0
0 0 (IIc(Ic−1) ⊗ Σ2η−1)
+W ′c1V −1c Wc1 + Tc∑
t=2
(W ′ctΣ
−1
c Wct)

−1
. (35)
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B The definition of explanatory variables (zij,c)
In this appendix we describe the characteristics that we use to explain the cross-price
effects. If necessary we give a formal mathematical definition. We organize the charac-
teristics based on the level at which they are defined (category level, brand level or both)
and the concept they measure (eg. competitive intensity). For the sake of comparion we
closely follow Fok et al. (2006) for the choice and definitions of the variables.
In this appendix we use the following notation:
Sict Sales volume of brand i in category c at time t
Mict = Sict/
∑Ic
i=1 Sict Market share of brand i at time t
M ic =
1
Tc
∑Tc
t=1Mict (Time) average market share
Pict (Actual) price of brand i in category c at time t
RPict Regular price of brand i in category c at time t
RP c =
1
IcTc
∑Tc
t=1
∑Ic
i=1RPict Average regular price in category c
PIict = Pit/RPit (Promotional) Price index
The explanatory variables are defined as follows
Category-Specific Characteristics
Average budget share 1
Tc
∑Tc
t=1
∑Ic
i=1 SictPict
Utilitarian low (0), middle (0.5), high (1) (defined in Fok et al.
(2006))
Perishability low (0), middle (0.5), high (1) (defined in Fok et al.
(2006))
Market concentration
∑Ic
i=1M ic logM ic, see Raju (1992)
Price dispersion
∑Tc
t=1 (maxi (RPict)−mini (RPict)) /
(
Tc ·RP c
)
Category- and Brand-Specific Characteristics
Price promotion frequency percentage of observations where price index is below
0.95.
Depth of price promotions
∑Tc
t=1 log(PIit)
FREQic
, where FREQic denotes the price promo-
tion frequency of brand i in category c.
Feature/Display frequency
(brand level)
average of the percentage of SKUs promoted by the
brand over time.
Feature/Display frequency
(category level)
∑Tc
t=1 1−
∏Ic
i=1(1−xit)
Tc
, where xict denotes the percentage of
SKUs promoted by brand i in category c at time t.
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Brand-Specific Characteristics
Similarity of price Absolute distance between attacker and victim brand’s
average regular price relative to the average category
regular price
Similarity of size absolute distance between attacker and victim average
market share
Asymmetric price effect indicator variable that equals one if the attacker brand
is more expensive than the victim brand, zero otherwise.
Asymmetric size effect indicator variable that equals one if the attacker brand
has a higher average market share than the victim
brand, zero otherwise.
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